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Abstract 
To date, existing studies that use multilayer networks, in their multiplex form, to 
analysing the structure of financial systems, have (i) considered the structure as a non-
interconnected multiplex network, (ii) no mechanism of multichannel contagion has 
been modelled and empirically evaluated and (iii) no multichannel stabilisation 
strategies for pre-emptive contagion containment have been designed. This paper 
formulates an interconnected multiplex structure, and a contagion mechanism 
among financial institutions due to bilateral exposures arising from institutions’ 
activity within different interconnected markets that compose the overall financial 
market. We design minimum-cost stabilisation strategies that act simultaneously on 
different markets and their interconnections, in order to effectively contain potential 
contagion progressing through the overall structure. The empirical simulations 
confirm their capability for containing contagion. The potential for multichannel 
contagion through the multiplex contributes more to systemic fragility than single-
channel contagion, however multichannel stabilisation also contributes more to 
systemic resilience than single-channel stabilisation. 
I:  Introduction 
Real and engineered systems have multiple subsystems and layers of connectivity. 
Networks are now established as models providing insights into the structure and 
function of complex systems. Single-layer networks, however, are unable to address 
the emerging multilayer patterns of interactions and self-organisation among entities 
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in complex systems. That challenge has called for the development of a more general 
framework – multilayer networks. The theory of multilayer networks is in its early 
stages, and a comprehensive review of recent progress is provided in Kivelä et al. 
(2014) and Boccaletti et al. (2014). Among existing studies, a promising mathematical 
framework is based on tensors and introduced by De Domenico et al. (2013, 2015). A 
special case of multilayer networks are multiplexes, where each layer consists of 
mostly the same nodes, and edges within a layer exist only between different nodes 
while links between layers exist only between instances of the same node in different 
layers. According to the formal definition in De Domenico et al. (2013, 2015) and 
Kivelä et al. (2014), a fundamental aspect of modelling multiplex networks is taking 
into account and quantifying the interconnectivity between layers, as it is responsible 
for the emergence of new structural and dynamical phenomena in multiplex 
networks. 
Multilayer networks, in their multiplex form, have been introduced within the last 
three years to analysing the structure of financial systems, and existing studies have 
modelled and evaluated interdependencies of different type among financial 
institutions. In particular, the global financial crisis that erupted in August 2007 clearly 
illustrated the role of financial linkages as a channel for propagation of shocks. 
Indeed, the spreading of the financial turmoil from the US sub-prime mortgage 
market via the securitisation instruments to the banks’ off-balance-sheet vehicles and 
further to the banks’ balance sheets and to other financial and non-financial sectors 
exposed unforeseen counterparty linkages and eroded confidence in a way which 
further amplified the effect of the initial shocks.  
 
Research in the area of financial network analysis has shown that modelling the 
interlinking exposures either between financial institutions, among the sectors of the 
economy or across entire national financial systems, can assist in detecting important 
shock transmission mechanisms. Policy recommendations could then be targeted 
towards structural changes that mitigate the adverse consequences that may emerge 
in closely intertwined systems in times of crisis. Related to the multilayer network 
analysis, empirical studies have considered the structure as a non-interconnected 
multiplex rather than as an interconnected multiplex network. However, no 
mechanism of multichannel contagion has been modelled and empirically evaluated, 
and no multichannel stabilisation strategies for pre-emptive contagion containment 
have been designed. 
This paper formulates an interconnected multiplex structure, and a contagion 
mechanism among financial institutions due to bilateral exposures arising from 
institutions’ activity within different interconnected markets that compose the overall 
financial market. We introduce structural measures of absolute systemic risk and 
resilience, and relative systemic-risk indexes. The multiple-market systemic risk and 
resilience allow comparing the structural (in)stability of different financial system or 
the same system in different periods. The relative systemic-risk indexes of institutions 
acting in multiple markets allow comparing the institutions according to their relative 
contributions to overall structural instability within the same period. Based on the 
contagion mechanism and systemic-risk quantification, this study designs minimum-
cost stabilisation strategies that act simultaneously on different markets and their 
interconnections, in order to effectively contain potential contagion progressing 
through the overall structure. The stabilisation strategies subtly affect the emergence 
process of structure to adaptively build in structural resilience and achieve pre-
emptive stabilisation at a minimum cost for each institution and at no cost for the 
system as a whole.  
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We empirically evaluate the new approach using large regulatory databases, 
maintained by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) of the Bank of England, that 
include verified capital requirements for UK-incorporated deposit takers and 
investment firms and granular information on their bilateral exposures due to 
transactions in the fixed-income market, securities-financing market, and derivatives 
market. The empirical simulations of the designed multichannel stabilisation 
strategies confirm their capability for containing contagion. The potential for 
multichannel contagion through the multiplex contributes more to systemic fragility 
than single-channel contagion, however multichannel stabilisation also contributes 
more to systemic resilience than single-channel stabilisation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses the related literature on 
multilayer networks. Importantly, in Section II, we discuss the gaps in the existing 
research and outline our contributions to the field. Section III describes and visualizes 
the datasets. In Section IV: (i) a single-layer contagion mechanism is formulated 
aligned with current regulatory requirements; then (ii) corresponding relative 
systemic-risk indexes of institutions and absolute measures of the layer’s systemic risk 
or resilience are quantified; and finally (iii) a single-layer strategy is designed for 
building in structural resilience and evaluated empirically. Section V: (i) formulates a 
multichannel contagion mechanism within the banking system due to exposures 
arising from banks’ interactions in the three interconnected markets; (ii) quantifies 
corresponding multiplex systemic-impact indexes of institutions and structural 
systemic risk of the multilayer system; (iii) designs and empirically evaluates 
minimum-cost multichannel stabilisation strategies. Finally, Section VI states the 
conclusions and sets directions for further research. 
II:  Related literature and contribution  
Multilayer networks, through the special case of multiplexes, have only been 
used in the last three years to study interdependencies among entities within financial 
systems. Multiplexes can model different type of relations (edges) existing among a 
set of entities (nodes) in a system and include interlayer dependence (edges). 
Serguieva (2012) argued that though single-layer network models had been gradually 
adopted in the structural analysis of financial systems, such analysis rather required 
more effective models as network of networks and ensemble networks. Serguieva 
(2013a, 2013b) outlined how an interconnected multiplex can be used to model the 
different type of exposures among banks, arising from their activities in different 
markets trading different financial instruments, and suggested using the tensorial 
framework. The current paper starts with this earlier idea, and now – having access to 
data – develops the model in detail, implements empirically, and extends the 
methodology towards contagion and stabilisation analysis. Serguieva (2015, 2016a) 
address how the multilayer network can be extended further to incorporate financial 
market infrastructures. A multiplex model is also used in Bargigli et al. (2015) to 
present the Italian interbank market, where exposures are broken down in different 
layers by maturity and by the secured and unsecured nature of contracts. They 
evaluate similarity between the structures of different layers and find the differences 
are significant. The conclusion is that the structural differences will have implication 
for systemic risk. The authors do not formulate or evaluate systemic risk, and the 
study considers the layers separately as a non-interconnected multiplex. The 
interconnected multilayer structure of the interbank market is not analysed. 
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Next, Poledna et al. (2015) use a multiplex model to quantify the contributions 
to systemic risk of the Mexican banking system from four layers: deposits and loans, 
securities cross-holdings, derivatives, and foreign exchange. They implement Debt 
Rank (Battiston et al., 2012) to measure systemic risk as fraction of the economic value 
in a network that is potentially affected by the distress of some banks. The systemic 
risk of a layer is the average Debt Rank of all banks due to their connectivity in that 
layer, and the total risk of the system is the average Debt Rank of all banks due to the 
connectivity in the projection of all layers. The results show a non-linear effect, with 
the sum of systemic risk of all layers underestimating the total risk. The suggested 
comprehensive approach in the study accounts for the capital, assets and liabilities of 
banks, but does not consider their minimum capital requirements and risk-weighted 
assets. A bank is considered failed in the real system, however, when its capital 
depletes to the level of minimum capital requirements, not when it depletes entirely. 
The minimum capital requirements are based on risk weighted assets, and two banks 
with the same amounts of capital, assets and liabilities, will differ in their amounts of 
risk-weighted assets. Therefore, they will differ in their minimum capital requirements, 
and thus differ in their funds available in excess of the minimum. The funds in excess 
of the required minimum are those that can be used to cover exposures as they 
materialise. Our study shows that this requires modifying to a different extent the 
impacts among different financial institutions, in order to simulate contagion that 
accounts for each institution’s individual conditions for failure and corresponding 
individual spreading rates within the contagion process. This has a significant effect 
on potential contagion processes and their outcome. Further, Poledna et al. (2015) 
consider different layers but assume the combined system is the projection of all 
layers rather than the multiplex of interconnected layers, and therefore do not model 
contagion throughout the multiplex structure. 
The current paper also builds on research done at the Bank of England. Langfield 
et al. (2014), where the authors argue that markets for different financial instruments 
are distinct in their economic rationale and function, and discuss potential advantages 
of analysing the interbank market as an interlinked structure of different network 
layers. They provide an in-depth empirical analysis of layers in the UK banking system, 
but do not model a multilayer network neither quantify systemic risk.  
In conclusion:  
(i) the theory of multilayer networks is in its infancy,  
(ii) there are very few studies addressing multilayer or multiplex networks 
when analysing the structure of financial systems,  
(iii) existing studies of interlinkages within banking systems have recognised 
their multilayer structure and modelled each layer as a network,  
(iv) contagion processes within each layer and within the projection of all 
layers have also been modelled, and the corresponding systemic risk has 
been quantified in monetary terms.  
However, within the existing literature: 
(i) the system has not been modelled as an interconnected multiplex;  
(ii) multilayer contagion processes have not been formulated,  
(iii) the existing single-layer contagion models are not closely aligned with 
regulatory requirements 
(iv) no stabilisation strategies have been designed for pre-emptive, 
minimum-cost contagion containment. 
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With this paper we address concerns (i)-(iv), formulate solutions, and provide 
empirical results. We work with the tensorial mathematical framework, which has 
not been used in financial analysis, and in Serguieva (2016a) derive step-by-step 
tensors of ranks two, four, and six within the context of financial systemic risk. 
Providing detailed domain interpretation of the models allows Serguieva (2016a, 
2017a) to extend the range and scope of stress-testing scenarios.  
In this paper, without going into the details of tensor analysis, we directly use 
the derived tensor models and focus only on concerns (i)-(iv). Their solutions 
effectively formulate an approach for building-in structural stability within the 
banking system and resilience against potential crises. Though resilience is 
quantified as a structural rather than monetary measure, when built in it provides 
for sustaining a system’s monetary value. Importantly, resilience is achieved 
through subtly and adaptively balancing the emergence process of structure, 
rather than through penalising institutions. Systemic instability is due to the 
emerged structure rather than being a fault of an institution. We do not 
recommend collecting a fund of penalties and waiting for institutions to get in 
distress before accessing it, as suggested in Markose (2012). Instead, containment 
of potential contagion is achieved pre-emptively by introducing a minimum 
change to the structure in each period, at a minimum cost for each institution 
and no cost for the system as whole.  
III:  Empirical data and visualisation 
The data used in this paper are large counterparty exposures reported by systemically 
important UK-incorporated deposit takers and investment firms to the Bank of 
England’s supervisory arm, the Prudential Regulation Authority. At the time of our 
investigation, the data spanned five quarters, a pilot in June 2014 and collections in 
December 2014 to September 2015. We access from the database, the firms’ twenty 
largest exposures to banks, where banks are broadly defined as 
 banks 
 building societies 
 broker-dealers 
 and additionally, exposures to the eight largest UK banks are reported if not a 
top twenty counterparty 
The firms report these large exposures gross, except where a legally enforceable 
netting agreement exists between the transacting entities. The reports are on a UK-
consolidated basis. Further, we have data on counterparty exposures broken down 
by financial market. Each market in turn consists of a range of financial instruments 
and transactions. These markets and their attendant instruments and transactions are 
as follows: 
 the fixed income market, consisting of senior, subordinated and secured debt 
instruments reported gross at mark-to-market (MtM) values, further segmented 
by residual maturity and currency 
 the securities financing market, consisting of securities lending and borrowing, 
and repo and reverse repo transactions reported gross notional, with further 
breakdowns by residual maturity, currency and type of collateral 
 derivative exposures reported net MtM after collateral and net MtM at default, 
split by various derivative contract types 
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The second database used in this study is the extensive Banking Sector 
Monitoring (BSM) database maintained by the PRA, where we access quarterly data 
on UK-consolidation basis for the reporting institutions, including: 
 Total Own Funds  
(Common Equity Tier 1 Capital + Additional Tier 1 Capital + Tier 2 Capital); 
 Total Risk Exposure Amount (risk-weighted assets) 
 Ratio of Total Own Funds to Total Risk Exposure Amount 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Large exposures of UK-incorporated deposit takers and significant 
investment firms – empirical multilayer structure by type of market 
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These data are further complemented with calculations from an in-house PRA tool 
for verifying the Capital Adequacy of each reporting institution, including: 
 Minimum Capital Requirement; 
 Ratio of Available Regulatory Capital to Total Own Funds. 
The empirical data on inter-institutional exposures are visualised in Figure 1, where 
each of the three layers corresponds to the exposure structure within a different type 
of market – fixed-income, securities-financing, and derivatives. The size of nodes 
representing institutions is proportionate to the number of exposure links they 
participate in. Figure 1 is based on one of the quarterly periods, between June 2014 
and September 2015, however it presents key features observed in all periods – the 
markets differ in their emerging exposure structures. Particularly, different institutions 
to a different extent, and a different number of institutions, have a key role (visualised 
as more interconnected, larger size nodes) in different markets. Therefore, the analysis 
will better inform and facilitate regulation if each market is incorporated distinctly 
within an overall multilayer structure, rather than all markets being amalgamated into 
(projected on) a single network of exposures as visualised in Figure 2. This figure 
presents the same quarterly period but does not observe the richer structure from 
Figure 1. 
The argument for the structural differences between markets is further supported 
with the visualisation in Figure 3, where each market is clustered into communities 
according to edge betweenness. Betweenness of an edge (exposure link) is a measure 
based on the number of shortest paths (smallest number of links) between any two 
nodes (institutions) in the network that pass through that edge. If a large number of 
shortest paths pass through the same edge, then it is in the bottleneck linking 
communities of nodes. Different colours are used in Figure 3 for different 
betweenness communities within the three financial markets. Possible contagion 
paths within communities are little obstructed but such between communities are 
less accessible. Therefore, contagion will progress differently within the different 
layers (markets), as they have different betweenness communities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Large exposures of UK-incorporated deposit takers and 
significant investment firms – empirical single network 
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In addition to the graphical depiction in Figure 3 of network characteristics at the 
three different markets, we further estimate Katz-Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987) 
of the individual nodes (institutions). Katz-Bonacich centrality measure of a given 
institution depends on how many other institutions in the exposure network are 
connected with it and up to what extent. Since Katz-Bonacich centrality of each node 
depends on both the network connectivity and the node’s degree of connectedness, 
it throws light on each institution’s importance in the exposure structure, and 
therefore provides a glimpse into its possible impact on a contagion process within 
the network. Table 1 presents the ranking of ten anonymized institutions according 
to their Katz-Bonacich centralitiy. It shows that each institution has a different rank in 
different markets. The variation in the ranking of an institution across different 
markets provides an evidence that the dynamics of contagion processes will differ in 
different markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Large exposures of UK-incorporated deposit takers and significant 
investment firms – empirical betweenness communities by type of market 
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Table 1: Katz-Bonacich Centrality 
Institutions Fixed-income rank SF rank Derivatives rank 
I 2 1 5 
II 4 19 13 
III 6 18 1 
IV 8 9 15 
V 10 8 12 
VI 12 13 2 
VII 14 6 8 
VIII 16 12 17 
IX 18 14 20 
X 20 19 21 
Note: This table reports the empirical rank of institutions according to their 
Katz-Bonacich Centrality. The results are based on data for one of the quarters 
in the period June 2014 to September 2015. Institutions refer to anonymized 
banks. Fixed-income refers to the fixed income market, SF refers to the 
securities financing market and Derivatives to the derivatives markets. 
 
We provide a detailed comparison in Serguieva (2016a, 2017a) of the structure and 
centralities of single-layers (markets) within any of the available quarterly data 
periods, and a comparison among periods, concluding decisively that the structures 
differ. Thus analytical approaches that consider markets are incorporated distinctly 
(Figures 1 and 3) or indistinctly (Figure 2), within the overall structure of exposures, 
will observe different contagion processes, identify different systemic risk measures 
and indexes, and recommend different stabilisations strategies. It is also necessary to 
evaluate links between markets (see section V), and then the argument is clear that a 
multilayer network – incorporating all interconnected markets simultaneously but 
distinctly – provides the more realistic results. 
IV: Formulation and evaluation of single-market contagion 
dynamics and design of effective stabilisation strategies 
4.1. Contagion dynamics in the derivatives market 
A link in the derivatives market will generally represents how an institution  𝑖  impacts 
another institution  𝑗  in that market – the contribution of  𝑖  to 𝑗’s  probability of 
failure – as suggested in (Markose, 2012). We build the structure here involving 
further details and scenarios and following closely the current regulation and the 
definition of different exposures data, in comparison with existing studies, and modify 
the optimisation in approximating the contagion process. First, the probability of 
failure of an institution  𝑗  after the start of a contagion process is modelled as 
dependent on 𝑗’s  own funds and its minimum capital requirement (Serguieva, 2016a, 
2017a). The contagion dynamics is analysed for the 22 reporting institutions, referred 
to collectively as ‘banks’. 
 The current regulatory reporting framework recommended by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and implemented in the UK, and the 
accounting standards with reference to UK GAAP and the International Financial 
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Reporting Standards, look at the different nature of derivatives in comparison 
with other financial instruments. Banks report their net MtM after collateral 
derivatives exposures (NAC), and their net derivatives exposures-at-default 
(EAD). Reported NAC values are non-negative and account for enforceable 
bilateral netting arrangement4 between non-defaulted banks throughout 
different netting sets, and for received collateral5. The reported exposure-at-
default values6 (EAD) are non-negative and account for collateral, netting 
arrangement, and adds-on applicable at default (see footnotes 4,5,6), and as a 
result the EAD amounts are larger than the NAC amounts. We will first use EAD  
values, and the impact among institutions in the derivatives market will be 
denoted with the matrix  𝑆 = [𝑠𝑖𝑗 ]  of size  𝑛 × 𝑛 , where each element  𝑠𝑖𝑗   
reflects a failed bank’s  𝑖  contribution to the default probability of a second bank  
𝑗 , and  𝑛  is the number of reporting institutions. The elements  𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
  are 
proportionate to the reported by bank  𝑗  exposure at default  𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖  to bank  𝑖,  
and inversely proportionate to the own funds  𝐶𝑗  of bank  j.  The impact matrix  
𝑆   can include both a positive component  𝑠𝑖𝑗   proportionate to  𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖 𝐶𝑗⁄   and 
a positive component  𝑠𝑗𝑖
  
 
  proportionate to  𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑖⁄ .  This is due to received 
collaterals, netting sets and adds-on applicable at default. In comparison, existing 
studies on contagion in derivatives markets assume that impact between two 
institutions exists only in one direction and approximate it as proportionate to 
the differences in gross exposures. 
 Further, when bank  𝑖  defaults, then the available funds  𝐴𝑗  of bank  𝑗  are 
reduced with the reported amount of its exposure at default  𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖  to bank  𝑖.  
Here, the available funds  𝐴𝑗 = 𝐶𝑗 −𝑀𝐶𝑗  are the difference between the total 
own funds  𝐶𝑗  and the minimum capital requirements  𝑀𝐶𝑗  of  j .  When bank  j  
defaults, the own funds available funds  𝐴𝑖  of bank  𝑖  are reduced with the 
reported amount of its exposure at default  𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗  to bank  𝑗.  The Own Funds of 
a bank are evaluated as the sum of its Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1), 
Additional Tier 1 Capital (AT1), and Tier 2 Capital (T2). The Minimum Capital 
Requirements to be maintained by a bank are set by current regulation as a 
percentage of its Total Risk Exposure Amount (risk weighted assets), including 
buffers in the case of some institutions, and verified by the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority. 
 The non-negative impacts  𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
  include the case when  𝑗  receives greater 
collateral from  𝑖  that brings the reported exposure to zero (see footnote 5). If 
bank  𝑗  does not report an exposure  𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖  to  𝑖  because the two institutions 
                                                          
4  According to the regulatory reporting directives, derivatives transactions are only netted if they are in 
the same netting set. A ‘netting set’ is a group of transactions with a single counterparty that are subject 
to a single, legally enforceable, bilateral netting arrangement. Each transaction that is not subject to a 
legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement is interpreted as its own netting set. Where cross-product 
netting is legally enforceable, such transactions are considered ‘nettable’. 
5  According to the regulatory reporting directives, Net MtM After Collateral for a netting set is computed 
as Net MtM Before Collateral less the value of collateral received from a counterparty to collateralise the 
exposure of that netting set. The collateral includes the one received under legally enforceable credit 
support annexes, as well as any collateral held in excess of what is legally required. The collateral only 
represents what is received / is in hand on a confirmed settlement basis, and does not include collateral 
owed to but not actually held by the firm. When collateral received is greater than Net MtM Before 
Collateral, then Net MtM After Collateral is zero. 
6  Exposure At Default (EAD) is the counterparty credit risk exposure net of collateral, as specified in the 
Prudential Requirements for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms BIPRU 13, and calculated either 
using the Mark-to-Market Method (BIPRU 13.4), the Standardised Method (BIPRU 13.5), or the Internal 
Model Method (BIPRU 13.6). 
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do not interact in the derivatives market (though they may interact in the fixed-
income and/or the securities-financing markets) then 𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
= 0.  When the 
exposure of  𝑗  to  𝑖  is below the reporting threshold then again  𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
= 0,  as  𝑖  
does not significantly impact  𝑗  directly and so does affect the structural analysis 
insignificantly. 
Therefore, the derivatives layer here is built as accurately as possible, using 
reported data without attempting approximation. In comparison, most studies 
work with aggregated data and approximate institution-to-institution exposures 
and impact. However, approximated structures differ from empirical systems in 
a way that cannot be anticipated, and thus mislead analysis and regulatory 
implications (Cont et al., 2013). 
Here, we consider the boundary case of a single market in isolation, when it 
is not aware of the liabilities in other markets. An intermediate case is to assume 
that institutions in the single market are aware of their overall but not bilateral 
liabilities in other markets, and the approach presented here can also be applied 
for that case. The intermediate case will account for the overall amount of 
exposures, but not for the dynamics of activating exposures in other layers and 
propagating impact among institutions and markets. The case when the multiple 
market system is aware of all granular exposures is analysed in Section V.  
 When the available funds  𝐴𝑖  of  𝑖  deplete, the bank is considered as failed. 
Therefore,  𝑝𝑖 =
𝐴𝑖
𝐶𝑖
 is the percentage of own funds that can be used to cover 
triggered exposures, and  𝑝𝑖  differs from institution to institution. Even if two 
banks i  and  j  have equal total own funds  𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶𝑗 , they may have very different 
minimum capital requirements  𝑀𝐶𝑖 ≠ 𝑀𝐶𝑗 , and therefore different ratios   
𝑝  
𝑖
≠ 𝑝  𝑗
 
 . Within the database used here, the ratios  𝑝𝑖  differ up to a factor of  4, 
i.e.   max   
1≤𝑖,𝑗≤𝑛
  
(𝑝𝑖/𝑝𝑗) ≈ 4.  In comparison, existing studies assume that  𝑝  is the same 
for all institutions and does not depend on risk-weighted assets. Assuming  𝑝  is 
the same corresponds to a spreading rate  (1 − 𝑝)  in the contagion process, for 
each institution. 
The following steps show how the contagion process progresses iteratively 
among the banks. Let 𝐵𝑞  is the set of banks defaulted by step  𝑞  and   
𝐵𝑞 = ⋃ 𝛽𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=1  , where  𝛽𝑘  represents the set of banks failed at step 𝑘. In order to 
describe the contagion process, we follow the logic in Firfine (2003) and Markose 
(2012). The condition for default of each bank 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵𝑞 at step (𝑞 + 1) in the 
contagion process is  
∑ (𝑠𝑗𝑖 )𝑗∈𝐵𝑞
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞
= ∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐶𝑖
)𝑗∈𝐵𝑞
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞
> 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 𝑝
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
         for  𝛼𝑖 > 1 . (1) 
At step (𝑞 + 1), Equation (1) verifies whether the net losses of the bank 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵𝑞 are 
greater than 𝑝𝑖 proportion of its capital 𝐶𝑖 . We set 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 = min 1≤𝑖≤𝑛  
(𝑝𝑖)
      , which 
corresponds to a spreading rate  (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)
     
. One can modify Equation (1) as   
∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐶𝑖
𝑚 )𝑗∈𝐵𝑞
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞
= ∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛼
𝑖
   𝐶𝑖
)𝑗∈𝐵𝑞
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞
> 𝑝  
𝑚𝑖𝑛
          for  𝛼𝑖
   
 
> 1. (2) 
Where 𝐶𝑖  
  
𝑚 = 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑖 > 𝐶𝑖. The unique  𝛼𝑖  for each bank  𝑖  is applied, and though 
the spreading rate is  (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) , the unique default condition for each institution 
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and its unique spreading rate is incorporated into the contagion dynamics 
through  𝛼𝑖 . 
Further going into the details of the contagion process, the following flowchart 
in Figure 4 would be helpful in understanding the evolution of the contagion 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 step  𝒒 = 𝟎 
A set of banks fail at time  𝑞 = 0.  This is due to a trigger that is internal or external 
to the system of reporting banks. It is not known what trigger will be active and 
which banks will fail. However, if the defaulted banks are denoted with  𝛽0 , then 
the probability of default of a bank  𝑖 ∈ 𝛽0  at  𝑞 = 0  is assumed as  𝜋𝑖,0    
𝑖∈𝛽0  
= 1 .  
The probability of default of the other banks  𝑖 ∉ 𝛽0  is assumed as insignificantly 
Figure 4: Flowchart for the contagion process 
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small  0 < 𝜋𝑖,0    
𝑖∉𝛽0  
= 
1
𝐶𝑖
 
𝑚
≪ 1 . Due to the failure of banks  𝛽0 , a contagion process 
starts, and the model derived here will account for any possible set  𝛽0 . 
 
 step  𝒒 = 𝟏  
The set of banks that fail at step  𝑞 = 1  is denoted with  𝛽1 . It is not known which 
banks participate in  𝛽1 , as the elements of  𝛽0  are not known in advance. A 
bank  𝑖 ∈ 𝛽1  fails at step  𝑞 = 1 , because  
  
∑ (𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝛽0  
(𝑖∈𝛽1) 
 𝐶𝑖
𝑚
 > 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 , and its probability 
of default at  𝑞 = 1  is  𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∈𝛽1
= 1.  On the other hand, the probability of default 
of banks  𝑖 ∈ 𝛽0  at  𝑞 = 1  is  𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∈𝛽0  
= 0 , as they already failed at step  at  𝑞 = 0 . 
Let us denote the set of banks that have failed by step 𝑞 = 1 as 𝐵1 , then   
𝐵1 = 𝛽0 ∪ 𝛽1 . For completeness, the set of banks that have failed by  𝑞 = 0  can 
be denoted as  𝐵0  where  𝐵0 = 𝛽0 , and therefore  𝐵1 = 𝐵0 ∪ 𝛽1 . The probability 
of default of a bank  𝑖 ∉ 𝐵1  surviving at  𝑞 = 1  is  𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∉𝐵1
=
    
∑ (𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝛽0  
(𝑖∉𝐵1) 
𝐶𝑖
 
𝑚
 < 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 
Here,  𝜋𝑖,0    
𝑖∉𝛽0  
≈ 0  are not taken into account as these are insignificantly small.  
 step  𝒒 = 𝟐 
The set of banks that fail at step  𝑞 = 2  is denoted with  𝛽2 , and the set of banks 
that have failed by step  𝑞 = 2  is denoted with  𝐵2 , where  𝐵2 = 𝐵1 ∪ 𝛽2 .  A bank  
𝑖 ∈ 𝛽2  (for 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵1)  fails at step  𝑞 = 2  because the depletion of its available funds 
exceeds the threshold  
   
∑ (𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝐵1  
(𝑖∈𝛽2) 
𝐶𝑖
 
𝑚
 
> 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛  , and its probability of default is  
𝜋𝑖,2    
𝑖∈𝛽2
= 1.  The probability of default of banks  𝑖 ∈ 𝐵1  at step  𝑞 = 2  is  𝜋𝑖,2    
𝑖∈𝐵1  
= 0,  
as they already failed at step  𝑞 = 0  or  𝑞 = 1.  The probability of default of a 
bank  𝑖 ∉ 𝐵2  surviving at  𝑞 = 2  is  𝜋𝑖,2    
𝑖∉𝐵2 
.  By analogy with the epidemiology 
literature,  (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  is the rate of infection, which in this case is a rate of 
‘spreading default’ or spreading losses. One percent of bank  𝑖’s  capital probably 
infected at step  𝑞 = 1  has the potential to infect  (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  percent of its capital 
at step  𝑞 = 2. If a bank fails due to infected (lost) capital it also loses up to  
(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  percent of its capital that has not been infected so far. Then these 
losses will affect other banks at the next step, etc. The percentage of 𝑖’s  capital 
probably lost at  𝑞 = 1  is  𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∉𝐵1
=
    
∑ (𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝛽0  
(𝑖∉𝐵1) 
𝐶𝑖
 
𝑚
 , which depends on  𝑖’s  exposures 
to banks that failed prior to 𝑞 = 1.  This  𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∉𝐵1  
  is also 𝑖’s  probability of default at  
𝑞 = 1  and has the potential to infect or to bring probable losses of  
(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∉𝐵1 
  percent of its capital at  𝑞 = 2.  Exposures of  𝑖  to banks  𝑗 ∈ 𝛽1  
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that failed at  𝑞 = 1  are lost at  𝑞 = 2 , and also contribute to the probability  
𝜋 𝑖,2    
𝑖∉𝐵2 
  of 𝑖’s default at 𝑞 = 2. Therefore: 
𝜋𝑖,2    
𝑖∉𝐵2 
= (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝜋𝑖,1    
𝑖∉𝐵2
+ ∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗
 
𝐶𝑖
 
𝑚
 𝜋 𝑗,1   
𝑗∈𝛽1
)𝑗∈𝛽1  
(𝑖∉𝐵2) 
   where   𝜋 𝑗,1   
𝑗∈𝛽1 
= 1   
It is not known prior to the start of contagion which banks will default at each 
step, and the probability  𝜋𝑖,2    
𝑖∉𝐵2 
 is derived here for any possible  𝐵0, 𝐵1 , 𝐵2 .  
 step  𝒒 
The set of banks that fail at step  𝑞  is denoted with  𝛽𝑞 , and the set of banks 
that have failed by step  𝑞  is denoted with  𝐵𝑞 , where  𝐵𝑞 = 𝐵𝑞−1 ∪ 𝛽𝑞 . A bank  
𝑖 ∈ 𝛽𝑞  (for  𝑖 ∉ 𝐵𝑞−1)  fails at step  𝑞  because  
   
∑ (𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝐵𝑞−1
(𝑖∈𝛽𝑞)  
 
𝐶𝑖
 
𝑚
 
 
> 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 , and its 
probability of default at  𝑞  is: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑞    
𝑖∈𝛽𝑞
= 1  (3a) 
For banks  𝑖 ∈ 𝐵𝑞−1 , the probability of default at step  𝑞  is: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑞         
𝑖∈𝐵𝑞−1
= 0 (3b) 
as they already failed prior to step  𝑞.  The probability of default of banks  𝑖 ∉ 𝐵𝑞  
surviving at  𝑞  is:  
𝜋𝑖,𝑞    
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞
= (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  𝜋𝑖,𝑞−1
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞  
+ ∑ [(
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗
 
  𝐶𝑖
𝑚
  ) 𝜋𝑗,𝑞−1   
𝑗∈𝛽𝑞−1
]𝑗∈𝛽𝑞−1
(𝑖∉𝐵𝑞)  
  (3c) 
for  𝜋𝑗,𝑞−1   
𝑗∈𝛽𝑞−1
= 1  and  𝜋𝑖,𝑞−1    
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞      
= (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  𝜋𝑖,𝑞−2
𝑖∉𝐵𝑞  
+ ∑ [(
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗
 
𝐶𝑖
𝑚
  ) 𝜋𝑗,𝑞−2   
𝑗∈𝛽𝑞−2
]𝑗∈𝛽𝑞−2
(𝑖∉𝐵𝑞)  
. 
 step  𝒒 = 𝒒𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒑 
The contagion process ends at  𝑞 = 𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  because all remaining banks fail by  
𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  or because none of the remaining banks fails  at  𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝. 
Equations (3a,b,c) present an iteration in the contagion process, and can be 
summarised into and approximated with the linear system of equations: 
Π𝑞
  = [(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)𝐼 + 𝑆
′
 
  
 
] Π𝑞−1
     (4a) 
where  Π𝑞
    is the non-negative probabilities vector of size  𝑛 : 
Π𝑞
  
𝐸𝐴𝐷
= [  𝜋1,𝑞
  , ⋯ ,   𝜋𝑖,𝑞
  , ⋯ , 𝜋𝑛,𝑞
  ]
′
      (4b) 
The impact matrix  𝑆   at each step  𝑞  of the contagion process, 0 < 𝑞 ≤ 𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝, is:  
𝑆 =
[
 
 
 
 
 𝑠11
⋮
𝑠𝑖1
⋮
𝑠𝑛1
…
⋱
…
⋰
…
𝑠1𝑗
⋮
𝑠𝑖𝑗
⋮
𝑠𝑛𝑗
…
⋰
…
⋱
…
𝑠1𝑛
⋮
𝑠𝑖𝑛
⋮
𝑠𝑛𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
    with    𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
= {  
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖
 
𝐶𝑗
 
𝑚
≥ 0  , 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
0                            , 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖 = 𝑗
 (4c) 
At step  𝑞 , the impact  𝑠𝑖
  
 
 of bank  𝑖  on institutions in the derivatives market is:  
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𝑠𝑖
  
 
=  ∑ ( 𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
)  =  ∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖
 
𝐶𝑗
 
𝑚
)  > 0𝑛𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑗=1    (5) 
and bank  𝑗  is affected with  𝑠𝑗
  
 
  by all institutions’ activity in this market: 
𝑠𝑗
  
 
=  ∑ ( 𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
 
)  =  ∑ (
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗𝑖
 
𝐶𝑗
 
𝑚
)  > 0𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1    (6) 
The contagion dynamics throughout steps from  𝑞 = 0  to  𝑞 = 𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  is expressed as 
the system of equations: 
Π𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝
  = [(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝐼 + 𝑆
′
 
  ]
  𝒒𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒑
  Π0
   . (7) 
4.2. Relative systemic-risk indexes and a structural  
measure of systemic-risk in a single market  
Control systems theory (Nise, 2011) tells us that if the maximum Eigenvalue of  
[(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝐼 + 𝑆
′
 
  ]  is  𝜆
[(1−𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝐼 +𝑆
′
 
  ]
  
max 
> 1  then the contagion process diverges to 
the destruction of the banking system at some  𝑞 = 𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝.  If  𝜆
[(1−𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝐼 +𝑆
′
 
  ]
  
max
< 1  
then the system survives and converges to a steady state at some  𝑞 = 𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 . This 
stability condition can be formulated in terms of the maximum Eigenvalue  𝜆
𝑆  
  
max
   
 
  of 
matrix 𝑆 .  Using Eigenvalue shifting and considering that the right and left 
Eigenvectors have the same corresponding maximum Eigenvalue, i.e.  𝜆
𝑆
 
 
  max = 𝜆
𝑆′ 
  
 
  
max 
  
denoted as  𝜆
  
max 
 , produces the stability condition: 
𝜆
[(1−𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝐼 +𝑆
′
 
  ]
  
max 
 =  (1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)  + 𝜆
  
max 
< 1      ⇒     𝜆
  
max 
< 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛   (8) 
Further, matrix analysis (Chatelin, 2013) asserts that the largest Eigenvalue of a real-
valued non-negative matrix is positive and has positive corresponding right and left 
Eigenvectors, if the matrix is irreducible. Here,  𝑆′ 
  
  
 is real-valued and non-negative 
but reducible, and its irreducible submatrix can be identified by applying Tarjan's 
algorithm. For the sake of simplicity in the notation, for the context of connected 
submatrix, all the variables are modified with ~ on the top. So, the strongly connected 
submatrix, denoted with  ?̃?
  = [?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
  ] , corresponds for the derivatives market. It 
does not include all reporting banks, however banks outside the strongly connected 
component have incomparably lower potential to influence the system. Therefore, 
the Eigenpair analysis is performed on the irreducible submatrix  ?̃?  , and corresponds 
to the contagion process: 
Π𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝
  = [(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) 𝐼 + ?̃?′
   ]
 𝑞𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝
  Π0
     (9) 
within the strongly connected component with 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 participating  
banks. The largest Eigenvalue of  ?̃?
    is  𝜆
?̃?  
  
max
 
 
 and we denote this as 
𝜆
?̃?  
  
max  
= 𝜆
?̃?′  
  
max 
= ?̃?
  
             
 
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
. Then the stability condition from Equation (8) transforms into:  
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?̃?
  
              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
< 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
= min
 1≤𝑖≤𝑚
(
𝐴(𝑖)
  
 
?̃?(𝑖)
  
 ) (10) 
where 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
  
 
  
 
is evaluated over the 𝑚  banks. The Eigenvalue satisfies the following 
inequalities: 
?̃?
  
              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
≤ ‖?̃?′
  
 
‖
∞
=
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑗≤𝑚  
(?̃?(𝑗)
  )  (10a) 
?̃?
  
              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
≤ ‖?̃?
  ‖
∞
=
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑖≤𝑚
(?̃?(𝑖)
  )  (10b) 
and according to Equations (5,6) this leads to: 
 
?̃?   
              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑖≤𝑚
(∑ (
𝐸𝐴?̃?(𝑗𝑖)
  𝐶𝑚(𝑗)  
)
𝑚
𝑗=1 ) ,
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑗≤𝑚
(∑ (
𝐸𝐴?̃?(𝑗𝑖)
  𝐶𝑚(𝑗)
   
) 
𝑚
𝑖=1 )]     (11) 
In other words, the largest Eigenvalue is bounded by the maximum impact of a bank 
on the strongly-connected derivatives submarket and by the maximum impact 
caused by that derivatives submarket on a bank.  
Notice that Eigenvalue shifting preserves Eigenvectors, and therefore  
finding the Eigenpair  ( ?̃?   
              
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,   𝑣  
[(1−?̃?  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 ) 𝐼+?̃?′]
 )  of  matrix 
[(1 − 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
)  𝐼 + ?̃?′
  ]  that represents the contagion process is equivalent to finding 
the Eigenpair  ( ?̃?
  
            
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
, 𝑣
?̃?′
  
)
 
 
 of  ?̃?′  . This Eigenpair is generated here through an 
iterative optimisation as follows: 
𝜗𝜏 =
(?̃?′ ) 𝜗𝜏−1
‖(?̃?′ ) 𝜗𝜏−1‖
 ∞
=
(?̃?′ ) 𝜗0
‖(?̃?′ )
𝜏 
 𝜗0‖
 ∞
         for     𝜏 ≥ 1 (12a) 
 
including a normalisation with the infinite norm  ‖(?̃?′
  ) 𝜗𝜏−1‖
∞
 at  
each iteration 𝜏, which assures that Equation (11) is satisfied. This  
Eigenpair  ( ?̃?
  
              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
,   𝑣  
?̃?′
 )
   
 is produced at convergence  𝜗𝜏 = 𝜗𝜏−1 , for  𝜗𝜏 = 𝜗𝜏−1 =
?̃?′𝑣?̃?′ = ?̃?
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣?̃?′ . Therefore:  
𝑣
?̃?′
= (?̃?′ )
−1
𝜗𝜏  (12b) 
If the resulting Eigenvector  𝑣
?̃?′
  
 is divided by the square of its Euclidean norm  
(  ‖𝑣?̃?′‖2 )
2  then: 
 
𝑢 =
𝜈   
?̃?′ 
 
 
(  ‖𝑣  
?̃?′
‖
 2
 )
2
 
            and           𝑢′ 𝜈  
?̃?′
 
 
=  1 (13a,b) 
Here, vector  𝑢  corresponds to  ?̃?   
             
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 and to the right Eigenvector  𝑣    of the 
transposed  ?̃?′   and satisfy Equation (13b). These are the qualities of the right 
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Eigenvector of the impact matrix  ?̃?   
  
 . So, the positive vector  𝑢 = 𝑢  
?̃?  
 gives the 
ranking, according to their systemic impact, of the banks participating in the strongly 
connected substructure of the derivatives market. The maximum Eigenvalue satisfies: 
?̃?
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑢′  
?̃?
 
𝑆′   𝜈   
?̃?′
 =  𝜈′   
?̃?′
 
 
?̃? 𝑢  
?̃?  
 (14) 
and relates to system’s stability. In the condition from Equation (10), the difference  
?̃?
  
            𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
 can be interpreted as the system’s distance from structural stability. If  
?̃?
  
             
 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 is only slightly larger than  𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
 then the system will be eventually destroyed 
but the contagion process will take long time, and it may be possible to intervene 
constructively. If  ?̃?
 
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 is quite larger than  𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
  then the contagion will be more 
intense, and the system will be destroyed quickly. Therefore, we can formulate the 
systemic risk emerging in the derivatives market as the structural measure: 
𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 = {
?̃?𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 0       (area of fragility)                
 0 , 𝑖𝑓  ?̃?𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 0       (area of resilience)
  (15a) 
This measure allows comparing the stability of two structures (markets) irrespectively 
of monetary values. For example, the banking systems in two countries may be 
similarly instable but involving different monetary values. The objective here, through 
designing stabilisation strategies in the next Sections, is to build in structural 
resilience. Then the system will better sustain its associated monetary values. 
We also formulate with Equation (15b) the systemic risk index of a bank  𝑖  in 
percentages. This can be interpreted as the percentage that  𝑖  contributes to systemic 
instability or to the systemic risk  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
  of that market:  
𝑆𝑅𝐼(𝑖)  
   
 
  =
{
 
 
 
 
 𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)   =
𝑢(𝑖)  
?̃? 
∑ (𝑢(𝑖)  
?̃?
)
𝑚
  
𝑖=1
 > 0;       for     𝑖 ∈ {1,⋯ ,𝑚 }         
 
  = 0   ;       for     𝑖 ∈ {𝑚 + 1,⋯ , 𝑛}                                        
   (15b) 
Banks participating in the strongly connected substructure of the market have 
positive indexes, while banks outside it have zero indexes and do not contribute to 
the 𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 . Here,  𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)            
  
  are relative measures and  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
   is an absolute measure, 
due to interconnectivity in the derivatives market. The index  𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)            
    
  of bank  𝑖  can 
be translated in absolute terms as the part  (𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)             
  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 ) that  𝑖  contributes to 
the structural systemic risk  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
  . 
4.3. Stabilisation strategies in a single market 
Most studies analysing the structure of financial systems do not quantify systemic 
risk. The few studies quantifying risk rarely comment on single-layer stabilisation 
strategies, and multilayer strategies have not been addressed. Existing studies of the 
derivatives market recommend that capital surcharges are collected only from very 
few top-ranked systemically important institutions, and set aside in a fund that then 
can be accessed by any institution when in distress. Such step will be helpful but not 
optimal. It will not really build in structural resilience into the system, and is not pre-
emptive as it expects institutions to fall in distress. When institutions fall in distress, 
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they will need large funding to be able to recover, and such approach is still at a 
significant cost for the system. The fund may deplete while helping some institutions 
and not others, as well. We consider that it is not sufficient to collect surcharges but 
it is important to distribute them optimally among all institutions, and it is necessary 
to collect them in an optimal cost-effective way. In order to achieve structural balance, 
not only the very top few institutions should participate in the stabilisation strategy 
but all institutions with nonzero systemic impact (nonzero systemic risk index). The 
most important institutions can be viewed as and are ‘most guilty’, but system’s 
instability is not entirely their fault – it is rather a fault of the emerged structure. 
Therefore, if a stabilisation strategy subtly and adaptively affects the emergence 
process of structure, it will build in systemic resilience and achieve pre-emptive 
stabilisation at a minimum cost. The participation of institutions in the strategy is 
proportionate to their systemic indexes but with a very small fraction of their capital, 
and these fractions are immediately redistributed optimally and granularly among the 
same institutions. The strategy is at no cost for the system, the surcharges are 
optimised at their minimum for an institution in comparison with other mechanisms, 
and the participation of any institution is less than its surcharges as it immediately 
proportionate compensations. The strategy includes a stabilisation step in the current 
period only if the systemic risk or resilience at the end of the last period was less than 
a targeted threshold. Therefore, the structure is maintained around the threshold, 
only minimum adjustments are required, and in some periods they may not be 
required. This could be implemented as part of the infrastructure mechanism, and 
would also play the role of monitoring systemic stability. If we look for an analogy, 
this mechanism may resemble the varying margin within the current clearance 
mechanisms. 
Based on the indexes from Equation (15b), a systemic risk surcharge for an 
institution  𝑖  is formulated as: 
𝑆𝑅𝑆(𝑖)  
 
 = 𝛾  𝑆𝑅𝐼(𝑖)              =  
= {
𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)   
  = 𝛾  𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)             
     for   0 < 𝛾 ≪ 1 ;  𝑖 ∈ {1,⋯ ,𝑚 }
0                                   for    𝑖 ∈ {𝑚 + 1,⋯ , 𝑛}                     
    (16) 
It is applied to evaluate a fraction  𝛾  𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)
  ?̃?(𝑖)  
 
𝑚  of its capital. Here, 𝛾   is very 
small and optimised to estimate minimum surcharges for each institution  𝑖  that when 
distributed in a balancing way to each institution  𝑗 , in proportion to the impact of  𝑖  
on  𝑗 , will bring the system to the targeted structural threshold. This is equivalent to 
building in structural resilience. The proportion is the ratio of the impact  ?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
  
   
  of 
bank  𝑖  on  𝑗  divided by the overall impact of bank  𝑖  on the derivatives market, 
?̃?(𝑖) =  ∑ ( ?̃?(𝑖𝑗) )
 
𝑚
𝑗=1 
 , for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,⋯ ,𝑚 }. Let us denote with  𝑋(𝑖𝑗)  the proportion 
of the surcharge on 𝑖 distributed to  . Equation (17) shows how impact matrix 
  ?̃? = [?̃?(𝑖𝑗) ]  changes into  ?̃?          
  
𝑟
 : 
 [?̃?𝑟(𝑖𝑗)
  
 
]   
= [?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
    
 
(1 + ∑ ( 
𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
 
𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
 𝐶(𝑗)𝑚
                    
  )
𝑚   
 
𝑖=1
)⁄ ] =  
  
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
   
  
1+∑ (𝛾 𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖) (
?̃?𝑖
𝑚
?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑛?̃?𝑗
)(
?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
  
   
∑ (?̃?(𝑖𝑞)
  
   
)
𝑚
𝑞=1
))𝑚𝑖=1
]
 
 
 
 
 
 (17) 
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It considers that the funds  ?̃?(𝑗)
  
 = ?̃?(𝑗) − 𝑀?̃?(𝑗)    available to  𝑗  increase to  
?̃?(𝑗)
               
𝑟 = ?̃?(𝑗)  +∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
     
𝑚  
 
 
𝑖=1
  with the proportionate fractions 𝑋(𝑖𝑗).  In Section 4.1, 
we denoted the ratio of available to total own funds of  𝑗  as  𝑝(𝑗) = ?̃?(𝑗)
  
   𝑝   
  
 
=
𝐴(𝑗)
𝐶(𝑗)
=
?̃?(𝑗)  
  
 𝐴(𝑗)
  
 
𝐶(𝑗)
 
𝑚                    
  Maintaining the parameter  𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
= 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
                 
𝑟
 in the simulation of 
contagion within the rebalanced structure leads to: 
𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
=
𝐴(𝑗)
  
 
𝐶𝑚(𝑗)
=
𝐴𝑟(𝑗)
𝐶𝑚,𝑟(𝑗)
=
𝐴(𝑗)
  
  +∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)𝑚𝑖=1
𝐶𝑚,𝑟(𝑗)
  (18a) 
and to a new modified value  ?̃?𝑚,𝑟(𝑗) after rebalancing: 
?̃?𝑚,𝑟(𝑗) = ?̃?𝑚(𝑗) (1 +
∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
𝑚
𝑖=1 
𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
   𝐶𝑚(𝑗) 
)  (18b) 
This produces the denominator in Equation (17), because  ?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
  =
𝐸𝐴𝐷(𝑗𝑖)
𝐶𝑚(𝑗)
  and: 
?̃?𝑟(𝑖𝑗)
  
=
𝐸𝐴𝐷(𝑗𝑖)
 
𝐶𝑚,𝑟(𝑗)
 =  
=
𝐸𝐴𝐷(𝑗𝑖)
 
𝐶𝑚(𝑗)(1+
∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
𝑚
 
𝑖=1 
?̃?  𝑚𝑖𝑛
    ?̃?𝑚(𝑗) 
)
=
?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
 
  
 
(1+
∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
𝑚
 
𝑖=1 
?̃?  𝑚𝑖𝑛
    ?̃?𝑚(𝑗) 
)
  (18c) 
The rebalancing preserves  ?̃?
  
𝑟
  as non-negative, and the Eigenpair analysis  
can be validly applied. Equation (17) reduces 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑖≤𝑚𝐸𝐴𝐷
(?̃?(𝑗)     
  
 
𝑟  
) and 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑖≤𝑚𝐸𝐴𝐷
(?̃?(𝑖)     
  
 
𝑟  
) 
, and from Equation (11) it follows that:  
?̃?
  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑟
≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑖≤𝑚
(?̃?(𝑗)     
  
 
𝑟  
) ,
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
1≤𝑗≤𝑚
(?̃?(𝑖)     
  
 
𝑟  
)] ≤ 𝜆
  
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
  (19) 
 
The largest Eigenvalue is reduced7, which is equivalent to increasing structural 
resilience. The parameter  γ   is identified, through search and optimisation, as the  
                                                          
7  If the model is considered without the financial context, then reducing the maximum Eigenvalue can be 
attempted alternatively. For example, by reducing the sum of elements in a row of  
the transposed [?̃?(𝑗𝑖)             
   
 
]
 ′
by increasing the denominator of the elements with a factor of (1 + 𝛿). (notice 
that each element in a row is  ?̃?(𝑗𝑖)   
   
 
=
 
𝐸𝐴?̃?(𝑖𝑗) ?̃?
𝑚(𝑖)⁄  and has the same denominator) In the financial 
context here, this will mean that we charge an institution  𝑖  with a fraction of its capital and then use that 
fraction to increase the capital of the same institution. The meaning of a systemic risk charge  for  𝑖 , 
however, is rather to increase funds available to institutions affected by  𝑖  and so reduce the impact  of  𝑖  
on them. 
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smallest value that when applied in Equation (17) transforms the system  ?̃?
  
 
  into a 
system  ?̃?
  
𝑟
  with targeted threshold  𝑆𝑅 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘           
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  
 . With a minimum structural change, 
the value of systemic risk in Equation (15a) moves in direction towards the area of 
resilience. 
 
The empirical analysis next is performed for one of the quarters in the period 
from June 2014 to September 2015, and the results are presented in Table 2. In that 
quarter, 19  out of the  22  reporting institutions participate in the strongly connected 
component within the structure emerging from interlinkages in the derivatives 
market. Therefore, 19 institutions have nonzero systemic-risk indexes and affect 
structural stability. The largest Eigenvalue is  0.07268  and satisfies the condition  
?̃?   
             
𝑚𝑎𝑥 < 0.14573,  indicating that the system is in the area of structural resilience. We 
can define a measure  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒   of structural resilience as:  
𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = {
 0 , 𝑖𝑓  𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 − ?̃?
  
            
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
< 0
𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 − ?̃?   
              
𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0           
 (20) 
 
If  𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
  is only slightly larger than  ?̃?
  
             
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 , the contagion process will eventually be 
contained but this will take long time, and a number of institutions will default though 
part of the system will survive. If  𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
  
  is quite larger than  ?̃?
  
              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 , then the contagion 
will be contained quickly and a large part of the system will survive. 
 
Table 2: Empirical Contagion Dynamics in the 
Derivatives Market 
n 22 
m 19 
𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
 
  
 
 0.14573 
?̃?
  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 < 0.14573 
?̃?
 
             
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
  for   𝛾 = 0 0.07268 
𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
    for   𝛾 = 0 0.07305 
Note: This table reports the empirical contagion 
dynamics in the derivatives market based on data for 
one of the quarters in the period June 2014 to 
September 2015. n refers to the number of reporting 
banks, mEAD refers to the number of banks in the 
strongly connected submatrix, EAD refers to net 
derivatives exposures-at-default, p refers to the 
minimum rate of recovery for the connected banks, 𝜆 
refers to the maximum stability condition for the 
connected banks, 𝛾 is the parameter optimised in the 
stabilisation strategy and SRResilience refers to systemic 
risk of structural resilience.  
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The empirical result here is  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.07305.  For a threshold of  𝑆𝑅 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘           
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑   
 
   
= 0,  
no stabilisation step is necessary at the start of the next quarterly period, and 
therefore results of simulating stabilisation strategies are not included in Table 2. We 
will note, however, that any movement in direction towards smaller  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 0  or 
larger  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
  > 0  is equivalent to building in resilience. For example, a meta 
strategy may involve different thresholds 𝑆𝑅 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘           
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
(𝑡𝑘) > 0 in different periods 𝑡𝑘 , 
1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑇,  so that the system gradually moves to a long-term target. A meta strategy 
may also involve buffer thresholds  𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
(𝑡𝑘) > 0  in some periods, as the current 
contagion and stabilisation analysis is in response to a trigger and the contagion it 
activates, but does not account for two different triggers activating a second 
contagion processes while the first is still running or just after it ends. A threshold 
must be selected carefully for a subtle effect, and the selection may depend on the 
scope, size and monetary value of the system or subsystem being analysed. 
 
Table 3: Comparative Empirical Results under NAC and EAD scenarios 
NAC EAD 
𝑛 𝑛 = 22 𝑛 = 22 𝑛 
m  𝑚𝑁𝐴𝐶 = 16 𝑚 = 19 m  
?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑛             
   
 𝑁𝐴𝐶  
 
 0.26843 0.14573 ?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑛            
   
   
?̃?
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶             
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 < 0.26843 < 0.14573 ?̃?
  
            
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
?̃?
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
  for   𝛾𝑁𝐴𝐶 = 0 0.00715 0.07268 ?̃?
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
  for   𝛾 = 0 
𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 𝑁𝐴𝐶    for   𝛾𝑁𝐴𝐶 = 0 0.26128 0.07305 𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
    for   𝛾 = 0 
Note: This table shows the comparative empirical results under net MtM after collateral 
derivatives exposures (NAC) and net derivatives exposures-at-default (EAD) scenarios 
based on data for one of the quarters in the period from June 2014 to September 2015. 
n refers to the number of reporting banks, m refers to the number of banks in the strongly 
connected submatrix, p refers to the minimum rate of recovery for the connected banks, 
𝜆 refers to the maximum stability condition for the connected banks, 𝛾 is the parameter 
optimised in the stabilisation strategy and SRResilience refers to systemic risk of structural 
resilience. 
 
Notice that Equations (4a,7) represent a more intensive contagion dynamics (a 
boundary scenario) than Equations (3a,b,c). The formulation of  [?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
  ] corresponds 
to analysis of a structure functioning as if the going-concern exposures to non-failed 
banks were also equal to the exposures at-default. The going concern principle in 
accounting is the assumption that an entity will remain in business for the foreseeable 
future. Next, we will perform the analysis of the derivatives layer for a structure 
functioning as if the going-concern exposures are equal to the net MtM exposures 
after collateral (NAC). These are the correct going-concern exposures, because up 
until its failure, a non-failed bank  𝑖  affects with NAC exposures the other non-failed 
banks  𝑗.   
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The NAC-scenario is also boundary, as it assumes that a failed bank  𝑖  affects 
with the going-concern exposure NAC a non-failed bank  𝑗,  instead with the exposure 
at-default EAD . The reported non-negative 𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑗  , for 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 , account for 
received collateral and for enforceable bilateral netting arrangement between non-
defaulted banks throughout different netting sets. The tensor (structure) can include 
both a positive impact  𝑠
𝑖𝑗
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶 > 0  of bank 𝑖 on bank 𝑗 proportionate to  𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑗𝑖 , and a 
positive impact  𝑠𝑖𝑗
  
   
𝑁𝐴𝐶
> 0  of bank 𝑗 on bank 𝑖  proportionate to  𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑗 .  Next, the 
steps described above for the  𝑆   analysis are now applied to  𝑆 
  
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶
,  and lead to 
evaluating the Eigen pair  ( ?̃?
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
,   𝑢  
?̃? 
𝑁𝐴𝐶
 )
    
  of the strongly connected 
substructure  ?̃?  
      
𝑁𝐴𝐶  = [?̃?(𝑖𝑗)
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
] , the indexes: 
𝑆𝑅?̃?(𝑖)             
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
=
𝑢(𝑖)
 
?̃? 
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶
∑ (𝑢(𝑖)  
?̃? 
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶
)
𝑚
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
𝑖=1
 
          for     𝑖 ∈ {1,⋯ ,𝑚𝑁𝐴𝐶} (21a) 
and the resilience: 
𝑆𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 𝑁𝐴𝐶 =
{
 
 
 
 0 , 𝑖𝑓    ?̃?
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
− 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶
≥ 0                                              
  |?̃?
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
− 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
| ,     𝑖𝑓  ?̃?
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶              
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
− 𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
𝑁𝐴𝐶
< 0
  (21b) 
 
Tables 3 and 4 report and compare empirical results for the NAC-scenario and the 
EAD-scenario. The structural resilience of the empirical system under the NAC-
scenario is 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒   
 
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶 
= 0.26128 , which is higher than the resilience under the EAD-
Table 4: Systemic Risk Ranking and Indexes in the Derivatives Market 
Institutions A B C D 
rank at  𝛾𝑁𝐴𝐶 = 0, 
(going-concern systemic 
dynamics) 
10 8 
0 
(not participating in the 
fragility strongly-connected 
component) 
7 
rank at  𝛾 = 0, 
(at-default systemic 
dynamics) 
3 8 10 15 
𝑆𝑅?̃?
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
(𝑖)  at  𝛾𝑁𝐴𝐶 = 0 2.34% 3.01% 0% 4.00% 
𝑆𝑅?̃?
  (𝑖)  at  𝛾 = 0  13.15% 5.09% 4.03% 0.81% 
Note: Systemic Risk Ranking and Indexes in the Derivatives Market based on data for one 
of the quarters in the period from June 2014 to September 2015. A-D refer to the 
anonymised banks,  NAC refers to net MtM after collateral derivatives exposures, EAD 
refers to net derivatives exposures-at-default   𝛾 is the parameter optimised in the 
stabilisation strategy, SRI(i) refers to Systemic Risk Index for the i-th bank in the strongly 
connected component. 
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scenario  𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  
  = 0.07305.  Different number of reporting banks have nonzero 
structural impact,  𝑚𝑁𝐴𝐶 = 16 ≠ 𝑚   
= 19,  and participate in the corresponding two 
strongly connected components. The ranking and index of each bank are different 
under the two scenarios. The institution encoded with  𝐴  in Table 4 is of higher 
ranking under EAD but lower ranking under NAC, which is also confirmed by its 
corresponding indexes. The opposite is true for institution  𝐷, it is of higher ranking 
under NAC and of lower ranking under EAD. Institution  𝐵  has the same rank 8 among 
the  𝑚𝑁𝐴𝐶   banks and among  the 𝑚  banks, but it has different indexes 
𝑆𝑅?̃?𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥         
  
  
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
(𝐵) = 3.01% and  𝑆𝑅?̃?𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
  
  
(𝐵) = 5.09%.  Bank  𝐶  is of medium ranking 
under EAD and is not ranked under NAC, therefore has zero structural impact  
𝑆𝑅?̃?𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
  
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
(𝐶) = 0.  
The empirical results confirm that if we would like to introduce subtle changes in 
the structure in order to increase its resilience, then different banks and to a different 
extent will participate in a strategy under each of the two scenarios. NAC and EAD are 
boundary scenarios, and the strategy can be formulated with surcharges depending 
both on NAC and EAD indexes, instead. In the terminology, we will use from now on 
‘systemic-impact index’ 𝑆𝐼𝐼(𝑖) instead of systemic-risk index 𝑆𝑅𝐼(𝑖), and 
correspondingly ‘systemic-impact surcharge’ 𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑖) instead of systemic-risk 
surcharge  𝑆𝑅𝑆(𝑖). This terminology accounts for the fact that the index measures the 
proportionate contribution of an institution to systemic risk, but also for the fact that 
this potential of an institution for structural impact can be used in stabilisation 
strategies to build in structural resilience. In the case of the EAD and NAC scenarios, 
the new terminology translates as: 
𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑖)𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
  = 𝑓 ( 𝛾  𝑆𝐼?̃?(𝑖)   
  
𝑁𝐴𝐶
,  𝛾𝑁𝐴𝐶  𝑆𝐼?̃?(𝑖)   
  ) (22) 
In comparison, Poledna et al. (2015) and Markose (2012) do not differentiate between 
the two types of derivatives exposure. The contagion algorithm in Poledna et al. 
(2015) prevents a failed bank to have effect beyond the period of its failure. The 
approach presented here builds in targeted resilience even when none of the 
institutions fails. It also does not directly restrict and so preserves the emerged 
preferences of interaction among banks, and so introduces minimum changes to the 
system. However, it introduces an incentive for institutions to adapt their preferences 
to the emergence of a more resilient structure of interactions. A next task is to extend 
the algorithm to provide that the effect of a non-failed bank is proportionate to NAC 
exposures, the effect of a failed bank is proportionate to EAD exposures, and a failed 
bank has no effect beyond the period it fails.  
 
V: Formulation and evaluation of multiple-market 
contagion dynamics and stabilisation strategies 
Banks, especially large ones, have numerous and dispersed financial operations, 
extensive off-balance-sheet activities, and opaque financial statements. They are 
highly interconnected through their capital markets activities, interbank lending, 
payments, and off-balance-sheet arrangements. For example, the BoE database used 
here accounts for the interaction of reporting institutions in the fixed-income market, 
securities-financing market and derivatives market.  
  
 
 24 
 
Section IV above does not consider simultaneously contagion dynamics due to 
connectivity within all markets and among markets, and this is the focus of Section V. 
For example if bank  i  is highly affected in the derivatives market by failing banks  
jϵ{1,…,n} and has to liquidate its other assets holdings (e.g. bond holdings) to cover 
the losses, then the stress in the derivatives market as downwards pressure on prices 
can transmit to other assets markets through bank i’s interlinkages in these markets. 
In other words, the interaction of bank i within the derivatives market has an impact 
on its interaction within the fixed-income market, and contributes to the probability 
of bank i failing in the fixed-income market due to its interlinkages in the derivatives 
market. 
A recent example is the 2007 subprime mortgage market crisis in the US that caused 
the values of various securities linked to US real estate to plummet, and developed 
into a full-blown international banking crisis with the collapse of the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Excessive risk-taking by banks such as 
Lehman Brothers (i.e. a strongly connected node) helped to magnify the financial 
impact globally.  
5.1. Theoretical formulation 
A model incorporating simultaneously but distinctly all interconnected markets can 
be formulated as a tensor-multiplex (Serguieva, 2016, 2017a), where  𝑆 is a tensor of 
rank four: 
𝑆 =  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
) 𝜀𝑖 ⊗ ?⃗⃗?
𝑗 
′
⊗ 𝜀ℓ ⊗ ?⃗⃗?
𝑘 
′𝑛 
𝑖=1
𝑛 
𝑗=1
𝑚 
ℓ=1
𝑚 
𝑘=1  (23) 
for   𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
{
= 0     if     𝑖 = 𝑗 ∧ ℓ = 𝑘 ∨  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∧ ℓ ≠ 𝑘
≥ 0     if     𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∧ ℓ = 𝑘 ∨  𝑖 = 𝑗 ∧ ℓ ≠ 𝑘
 
where  𝑚 = 3  corresponds to the three markets, i.e.  𝑘, ℓ = 1  for the fixed-income 
market,  𝑘, ℓ = 2  for the securities-financing market, and  𝑘, ℓ = 3  for the derivatives 
market. The number of institutions is  𝑛 , and  𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
    
≥ 0  is the impact of bank  𝑖 – 
due to its interaction in market  ℓ – on institution  j  acting in market  k.  The impact  
𝑆 𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
≥ 0  between two different institutions  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗  is due to their interaction within 
the same market  ℓ = 𝑘,  while the impact is  𝑆 𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
= 0  when we consider  𝑖  and  𝑗  
as acting in different markets  ℓ ≠ 𝑘.  Further,  𝑆 𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
≥ 0  when the same institution  
𝑖 = 𝑗  acts in different markets  ℓ ≠ 𝑘,  while  𝑆 𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
= 0  when this institution acts in 
the same market  ℓ = 𝑘.  An interconnected multiplex is a multilayer network where 
mostly the same nodes participate in different type of interactions 
(interdependencies), and the interaction of a node due to one type of activities is 
dependent on its interaction due to another type of activities. A tensor can be 
considered as an interconnected multiplex that also incorporates a basis (innate) 
structure. In Equation (23),  𝜀𝑖 ⊗ ?⃗⃗⃗?
𝑗 
 
′
⊗ 𝜀
ℓ
⊗ ?⃗⃗⃗?
𝑘 
 
′
 stands for the basis structure that 
includes four vectors  𝜀𝑖 ,  ?⃗⃗⃗?
𝑗 
 
′
, 𝜀
ℓ
 ,  ?⃗⃗⃗?
𝑘 ′
 in their cohesion or tensor multiplication, 
hence the tensor is of rank four. These vectors characterise, correspondingly, 
institutions  𝑖,  institutions  𝑗,  markets  ℓ , and markets  𝑘 , for  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,⋯ , 𝑛}  and  
ℓ, 𝑘 ∈ {1,⋯ ,𝑚}. Tensor-multiplex models expand the scope of feasible structural 
analysis and stress testing of the financial system (Serguieva, 2016, 2017a). Here, they 
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are only used in modelling contagion and stabilisation processes within multiple 
interconnected markets. 
We build the tensor of rank four as including nine subtensors of rank 2 (see 
Figure 5). The impact matrix  [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷 
 
  
 
]  in the derivatives market  (𝐷)  has the same 
meaning as  [𝑠𝑖𝑗 ]  in Section IV and: 
 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
= {
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝐷
𝑘=𝐷 
) = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷 
 
  
 
= 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)
   
 
            
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝐷
𝑘=𝐷 
) = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝐷 
 
  
 
= 0
 
     
                         
for   𝑖, 𝑗𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (24a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:   Four-dimensional structure of impact  
It captures impact among institutions within each  
financial market and between any pair of markets. 
fixed-income market (FI):  three-dimensional decomposition of size   
𝒏 × 𝒏 × 𝟑  of impact magnitudes, where affecting institutions are in 
market FI 
securities-financing market (SF):  three-dimensional decomposition of size   
𝒏 × 𝒏 × 𝟑  of impact magnitudes, where affecting institutions are in market 
SF 
derivatives market (D):   
three-dimensional decomposition of 
size  𝒏 × 𝒏 × 𝟑  of impact magnitudes, 
where affecting institutions are in 
market D 
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Banks report to the PRA database their exposures in the fixed-income  market  (𝐹𝐼)  
as gross MtM values, then  𝑀𝑡𝑀(𝑗𝑖)𝐹𝐼 
  
  will denote the exposure of bank  𝑗  to  bank  
𝑖  in the  𝐹𝐼  layer.  Banks also report their exposures in the securities-financing market  
(𝑆𝐹)  as gross Notional values, then  𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑗𝑖)𝑆𝐹 
  
  will denote the exposure of 
institution  𝑗  to  institution  𝑖  in the  𝑆𝐹  layer.  This reported information does not 
allow differentiating between going-concern and at-default multiplex exposures. 
 
The impact structure  [𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
] will be evaluated as follows. The impact matrix  
[𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼 
  
 
],  due to interconnectivity in the  𝐹𝐼  market, has elements: 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
  
 
  
 
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝐹𝐼
𝑘=𝐹𝐼) = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼 
 
  
 
= {
𝑀𝑡𝑀(𝑗𝑖)𝐹𝐼 
  
−𝑀𝑡𝑀(𝑖𝑗)𝐹𝐼 
  
  𝐶(𝑗) 
 
> 0           
0 , 𝑖𝑓 
𝑀𝑡𝑀(𝑗𝑖)𝐹𝐼 
  
−𝑀𝑡𝑀(𝑖𝑗)𝐹𝐼 
  
  𝐶(𝑗) 
 
≤ 0
                    
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝐹𝐼
𝑘=𝐹𝐼) = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝐹𝐼 
 
  
 
= 0                                      for 𝑖, 𝑗𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛}
 
 
  (24b) 
where   𝐶(𝑗) 
   are the total own funds of bank  𝑗.  The impact matrix  [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹
 
  
 
] , due to 
interconnectivity in the  𝑆𝐹  market, has elements: 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
  
 
  
 
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝑆𝐹
𝑘=𝑆𝐹) = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)𝑆𝐹
  
 
= {
𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑗𝑖)𝑆𝐹 
  
−𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑖𝑗)𝑆𝐹 
  
  𝐶(𝑗) 
 
> 0           
0 , 𝑖𝑓 
𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑗𝑖)𝑆𝐹 
  
−𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑖𝑗)𝑆𝐹 
  
  𝐶(𝑗)  
≤ 0
      
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝑆𝐹𝑇
𝑘=𝑆𝐹) = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝐹
  
 
= 0                                      for 𝑖, 𝑗𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛}
 
 
 (24c) 
The impact magnitudes between markets are correspondingly: 
 [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝑆𝐹
 
  
 
]  composed by the impact of institutions  𝑖  in the fixed-income market  
ℓ = 𝐹𝐼 on institutions  𝑗  in the securities-financing market  𝑘 = 𝑆𝐹 : 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
 
 
 
 (𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝐹𝐼
𝑘=𝑆𝐹)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝐹𝐼→𝑆𝐹 
  = ∑ 𝑠(𝑞𝑖)  𝐹𝐼 
 
  
 
𝑛
𝑞=1  
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝐹𝐼
𝑘=𝑆𝐹)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝑆𝐹 
  = 0                        
for  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑞𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (25a) 
 [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝐷 
  
 
]  composed by the impact of banks  𝑖  in market  ℓ = 𝐹𝐼  on banks  𝑗  
in market  𝑘 = 𝐷 : 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
 
 
 
 (𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝐹𝐼
𝑘=𝐷)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝐹𝐼→𝐷 
  = ∑ 𝑠(𝑞𝑖)  𝐹𝐼 
 
  
 
𝑛
𝑞=1  
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝐹𝐼
𝑘=𝐷)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝐷 
  = 0                        
for  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑞𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (25b) 
 [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝐹𝐼
 
  
 
]  comprises the impact of  𝑖  in market  ℓ = 𝑆𝐹  on  𝑗  in market   
𝑘 = 𝐹𝐼 , and  [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝐷
 
  
 
]  comprises the impact of  𝑖  in market  ℓ = 𝑆𝐹  on  𝑗  in 
market  𝑘 = 𝐷 : 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
 
 
 
 (𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝑆𝐹
𝑘=𝐹𝐼)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝑆𝐹→𝐹𝐼 
  = ∑ 𝑠(𝑞𝑖)  𝑆𝐹 
 
  
 
𝑛
𝑞=1
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝑆𝐹
𝑘=𝐹𝐼)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝐹𝐼 
  = 0                      
for  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑞𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (26a) 
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𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
 
 
 
 (𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝑆𝐹
𝑘=𝐷)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝑆𝐹→𝐷 
  = ∑ 𝑠(𝑞𝑖)  𝑆𝐹 
 
  
 
𝑛
𝑞=1
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝑆𝐹
𝑘=𝐷)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝐷 
  = 0                       
for  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑞𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (26b) 
 [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝐹𝐼 
  
 
]  includes the impact of  𝑖  in market  ℓ = 𝐷  on  𝑗  in market  𝑘 = 𝐹𝐼 , 
and  [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝑆𝐹
 
  
 
]   includes the impact of 𝑖  in market  ℓ = 𝐷  on  𝑗  in market   
𝑘 = 𝑆𝐹 : 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
 
 
 
 (𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝐷
𝑘=𝐹𝐼)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝐷→𝐹𝐼 
  = ∑ 𝑠(𝑞𝑖)  𝐷 
 
  
 
𝑛
𝑞=1
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝐷
𝑘=𝐹𝐼)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝐹𝐼 
  = 0                    
  for  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑞𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (27a) 
𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
=
{
 
 
 
 (𝑆  𝑖𝑗=𝑖
ℓ=𝐷
𝑘=𝑆𝐹)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑖)  𝐷→𝑆𝐹 
  = ∑ 𝑠(𝑞𝑖)  𝐷 
 
  
 
𝑛
𝑞=1
(𝑆  𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
ℓ=𝐷
𝑘=𝑆𝐹)   = 𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝑆𝐹 
  = 0                      
 for  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑞𝜖{1,⋯ , 𝑛} (27b) 
Equations (24a,25a,25b), Equations (24b,26a,26b) and Equations (24c,27a,27b) 
describe, respectively, the bottom, middle and top three-dimensional matrixes within 
the four-dimensional structure, which corresponds to the impact multiplex [𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
]
    
 
of size  n × n × 3 × 3.  In order to maintain the analogy between the variables that are 
used in Sections 4 and the variables that are going to be used in the multiplex 
unfolded context in this section, all the necessary variables that are used in Sections 
4 are used here with a hat (^) on them. The next step is to identify the multiplex 
strongly connected component. We apply Tarjan’s algorithm to the unfolded impact 
matrix [?̂?  𝑖𝑗]
    
 of size 3𝑛 × 3𝑛 created by unfolding the multiplex [𝑆  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
]  of size  n ×
n × 3 × 3  along the indices  𝑘  and  𝑙 , 
[?̂?  𝑖𝑗] =  
[
 
 
 
 
 
[𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝐹𝐼 
  ] [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝑆𝐹 
  ] [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐹𝐼→𝐷 
  ]
[𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝐹𝐼 
  ] [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝑆𝐹 
  ] [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝑆𝐹→𝐷 
  ]
[𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝐹𝐼 
  ] [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝑆𝐹 
  ] [𝑠(𝑖𝑗)  𝐷→𝐷 
  ]
 
]
 
 
 
 
   (28) 
and identify the  ?̂?   number of banks that have nonzero structural impact on the 
multiplex. The parameter  ?̂?
  
𝑚𝑖𝑛               
 
  
 
 
  in simulating the contagion process  
is evaluated over the multiplex strongly connected component [?̂̃?  𝑖𝑗]
  
  
 of  
size  3?̂? × 3?̂?    , and  ?̂̃?
𝑚(𝑗)  are the modified own funds corresponding to this 
parameter. The unfolding  [?̂̃?  𝑖𝑗]  is in the format from Equation (28), now for the  ?̂?  
banks, and preserves the spectral properties of  [?̂?  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
]
 
   
   of size  ?̂? × ?̂? × 3 × 3.  By 
analogy with the algorithm from Sections 4, now the Eigenpair  ( ?̂̃?   
          
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
,   𝑢
?̂̃? 
 
  )
 
of  
[?̂̃?  𝑖𝑗]
  
  is generated. Then, the Eigenpair  ( Λ̂̃
  
           
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
,   𝑈  
𝑆 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥
 
 ) for  [?̂̃?  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
]   is 
obtained as: 
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Λ̂̃
  
  
  
max 
= ?̂̃?
  
𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥     
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑    
  
max
    and     𝑈  
?̂̃? 
  
𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
⇐        𝑢
?̂̃? 
   (29) 
where  𝑈  
?̂̃?  
   is an Eigenmatrix of size  ?̂?
  
 × 3  rather than an Eigenvector.   
Following the approach in Serguieva (2016a, 2017a), we formulate the multiplex 
systemic risk  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
    and resilience  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 
   as:  
𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
  
  
 
  
 
=
{
 
 
 
 ?̂̃?
  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
−  ?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
   
 
  > 0               
 0  ,    𝑖𝑓   ?̂̃?
  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
−  ?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
≤ 0
   (30a) 
𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 
  
  
 
  
 
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
0  ,   𝑖𝑓  ?̂̃?
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
− ?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
≥ 0
?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
− ?̂̃?
  
 
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
< 0             
   (30b) 
The multiplex systemic-impact indexes are: 
𝑆𝐼?̂?(𝑖)             
  =  
=
{
 
 
 
 
𝑆𝐼?̂̃?(𝑖)   
   =
𝑈(𝑖)  
?̂̃? 
 
   
∑ (𝑟(𝑖)  
?̂̃? 
  
 
)
?̂?
  
  
𝑖=1
 
 ,    for   𝑖 ∈ {1, … , ?̂? } 
0  ,    for   𝑖 ∈ {?̂?
  
 + 1,⋯𝑛}                                      
 (31a) 
where: 
𝑈
?̂̃?  
 
  
 
= 𝑈  
?̂̃? 
 
 
   [1 1 1]′   (31b) 
and the with corresponding surcharges are: 
𝑆𝐼?̂?(𝑖)  𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
 
 
  = 𝛾  𝑆𝐼?̂?(𝑖)             =  
= {
𝑆𝐼?̂̃?(𝑖)  𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
 
  = 𝛾  𝑆𝐼?̂̃?(𝑖)  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥          
 
      for  0 < 𝛾 ≪ 1;  𝑖 ∈ {1,⋯ , ?̂? }
0                                 for    𝑖 ∈ {?̂? + 1,⋯ , 𝑛}                   
 (31c) 
The multiplex stabilisation strategy is designed as follows. The parameter  
 𝛾  is optimised to estimate the minimum fractions of capital 
 𝛾    𝑆𝐼?̂̃?(𝑖)    
   ?̂̃?𝑚(𝑖)      
  
         
  
for each institution  𝑖 ∈ {1, … , ?̂? }  that when distributed in a 
balancing way among institutions 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , ?̂? }, in proportion to the impacts of  𝑖  
within the multiplex, will bring the system to a targeted threshold  𝑆?̂? 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘           
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑   
  (𝑡)  or  
𝑆?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
   (𝑡).  The proportion is the ratio of the impact (?̃?  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
  
  
  of bank  𝑖  in 
market  ℓ  on bank  𝑗  in market  𝑘,  divided by the overall impact 
  ?̂̃?(𝑖)   
  = ∑ ∑ ∑ (?̂̃?  𝑖𝑞
𝑦
𝑧  
)
   ?̂?
 
𝑞=1
3
 
𝑦=1
3
 
𝑧=1  of bank  𝑖  within the multiple-market 
structure, for  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,⋯ , ?̂? }  and  ℓ, 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,3}.  Let the fraction that 𝑗 receives from 
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𝑖, in result of this, is denoted with  𝑋(𝑖𝑗) .  
Then the non-charged four-dimensional matrix ?̂̃?   
  
 
= [(?̂̃?  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
  
  
]
  
  
 representing the 
multiplex is modified into the impact structure  ?̂̃?   
  
 
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑
  as  follows: 
 
 
[(?̂̃?  𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
  
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑   
 
] = [(?̂̃? 𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
  
  
   
 
(1 + ∑ ( 
∑ ∑ (𝑋 𝑖𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
3  
𝑘=1
3  
ℓ=1
?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
  ?̂̃?(𝑗)
    
  
  
𝑚      
  )
?̂?
 
𝑖=1 )⁄ ] =  
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(?̂̃?
 𝑖
𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
   
  
1 +∑
(
 
 
 
 
 
?̂?    𝑆𝐼?̂̃?(𝑖)     
(
 ?̂̃?(𝑖)
  
  
𝑚       
?̂̃?
𝑚𝑖𝑛
    
 ?̂̃?(𝑗)
  
  
𝑚       
)
 
(
 
 
 
 ∑ ∑ (?̃?
̂ 𝑖
𝑗
ℓ
𝑘  
)
  
   
3  
𝑘=1
3  
ℓ=1
∑ ∑ ∑ (?̃?̂
 𝑖
𝑞
𝑦
𝑧  
)
  
 
 
?̂?
𝑞=1
3
 
𝑦=1
3
 
𝑧=1
)
 
 
 
)
 
 
 
 
 
?̂?
 
𝑖=1
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (32) 
for  0 ≤ 𝛾   
 ≪ 1  ;  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,⋯ , ?̂? }  ;  ℓ, 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,3} 
It considers that the funds  ?̂̃?(𝑗) = ?̂̃?(𝑗) − 𝑀?̂̃?(𝑗)  available to  𝑗  increase to  
?̂̃?(𝑗)
  
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  = ?̂̃?(𝑗)  + ∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
     
?̂?
𝑖=1
  with the proportionate fractions  𝑋(𝑖𝑗).  We 
denote the ratio of available funds to total own funds of  𝑗   
as  ?̂?(𝑗)  
 
 
  
 
= ?̂̃?(𝑗)  
 
 
  
 
  ?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
  
 
=
𝐴(𝑗)
   
 
?̂?(𝑗)   
  
        =
?̂̃?(𝑗)
  
 
  𝐴(𝑗)
?̂?𝑚(𝑗)
  
 . Maintaining the parameter  
?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
  
 
= ?̂?  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
  
 
  
  
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑
 , for comparability of the simulation of contagion within the 
initial and the rebalanced structures, leads to: 
?̂?
𝑚𝑖𝑛               
    =
𝐴(𝑗)  
 
  
 
?̂?(𝑗)
 
𝑚  
=
𝐴(𝑗)  
 
     
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
?̂?(𝑗)
    
𝑚  𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
=
𝐴(𝑗)  
 
  
  +∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
?̂?   
 
𝑖=1
?̂?(𝑗)
    
𝑚  𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
 (33a) 
and to a new modified value  ?̂̃?(𝑗)
    
𝑚  𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑   after rebalancing: 
?̂̃?(𝑗)
    
𝑚  𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 = ?̂̃?(𝑗)
 
𝑚   (1 +
∑ 𝑋(𝑖𝑗)
?̂?
 
𝑖=1 
𝑝  𝑚𝑖𝑛              
  ?̂?(𝑗)
 
𝑚   
)  (33b) 
which produces the denominator in Equation (32). 
The rebalancing reduces the largest Eigenvalue  ?̂̃?
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥               
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑
< ?̂̃?
  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥                  
, which is 
equivalent to building in structural resilience. Thus, the minimum redistribution pre-
emptively reduces the effect of potential contagion in quarter  𝑡  based on the 
multiplex structure of exposures and the minimum capital requirements at the end of 
quarter  (𝑡 − 1).  The mechanism can be implemented automatically within the market 
infrastructure. It does not restrict the emerged preferences of banks for interaction 
within the multiplex of markets, but rebalances – at minimum cost and adaptively – 
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how the system covers exposures collectively through the existing interlinkages. The 
mechanism also allows the banks to adapt their interaction preferences within the 
rebalancing impact structure, through incentives towards the emergence of a more 
resilient structure. In the terminology of computational intelligence approaches, this 
is analogous to the methodology of ‘reinforcement learning’. The optimum 
mechanism involves not only the very top few but all reporting institutions that have 
nonzero systemic impact within the multiplex of markets at end of quarter (𝑡 − 1). 
The institutions are involved proportionately to their systemic impact at  (𝑡 − 1) , 
which is their potential to affect structural fragility and resilience in quarter 𝑡. The 
subtle rebalancing uses this potential and builds in resilience, instead of allowing this 
potential to drive the system further into fragility. The mechanism does not collect 
the surcharges into a fund to sit aside, but immediately uses them to achieve a 
stabilisation effect pre-emptively. Waiting for institutions to get in distress in order to 
access a fund will cost more. The redistribution also immediately compensates all 
institutions after the surcharges, where different institutions are compensated to a 
different extent. Thus effectively, each institutions is charged even less than the 
fraction of capital evaluated at the first step of the algorithm. While the charge 
depends on the systemic impact of a bank, its compensations depend on the systemic 
impact of other banks that affect the first bank through interlinkages. Finally, the 
potential for multichannel contagion through the multiplex structure contributes 
more to systemic fragility than single-channel contagion, however a positive point is 
that multichannel stabilisation also contributes more to systemic resilience than 
single-channel stabilisation. 
5.2. Empirical evaluation 
The empirical results presented in Tables 5 and 6 are evaluated for one of the quarters 
in the period from June 2014 to September 2015. Table 5 indicates that the multiplex 
structure does not meet the stability condition  ?̂̃?
 
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
=< 0.1457 , and therefore is in 
the region of structural fragility. The systemic risk of the unbalanced structure is  
𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 
 
  
        
= 0.32867 , and contagion will not be contained if triggered. If a threshold of 
𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘            
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
 = 0 is targeted, then a stabilisation strategy with an  
optimum parameter  𝛾𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 = 0.02850  will bring the system below this threshold.  
The  structural  resilience  of  the  rebalanced  system  is  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  
 
  
        
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  
= 0.00005,  and 
contagion will be contained if triggered. The number of banks with nonzero systemic 
impact at the end of this quarter is  19,  and they participate in the stabilisation step 
at the start of the next quarter. Notice that the threshold may be  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘            
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑    
 ≠ 0.  Ffor 
example, within a long-term meta-strategy  0 < 𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘            
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
 (𝑡) < 𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘            
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
 
  (𝑡 − 1).  
Alternatively,  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 
  
     
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  
= 0.00005  may be considered as too small. Though a 
potential contagion will be contained, a significant part of the system may be 
destroyed. Thus, a larger resilience threshold may be targeted  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  
 > 0.00005. 
Table 6 presents the systemic impact indexes of three banks encoded as  𝐸, 𝐹, 𝐺.  
Institution  𝐸  has a high systemic impact in the multiplex and contributes significantly 
to multiple-market contagion and stabilisation. However,  𝐸  is of little importance in 
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the single-layer structure of the derivatives market, and will contribute little to 
destabilising or stabilising processes there. Institution  𝐹  is of medium importance in 
both structures, but contributes different proportions to systemic risk (resilience) in 
the multiple-market system and in the single market. Bank 𝐺 has no systemic 
significance in multiplex contagion, while still contributing systemic impact in the 
single market. The empirical results show that banks differ in their significance and 
ability to influence the structure under the multiple-market scenario and the single-
market scenario. The institutions will participate to a different extent in strategies to 
embed structural resilience under the two scenario. Stabilising the single market will 
not stabilise the multiplex of markets. Stabilising the multiplex will stabilise the single 
markets in the context of their interlinkages within the overall system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Structural Resilience of the Empirical Multiplex 
n 22 
?̂?  
19  
(18 overlapping banks 
with  
the derivative market) 
?̂̃?  
𝑚𝑖𝑛            
 
 
 
 
 0.14573 
𝜆
  
𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 < 0.14573 
  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 
  
     
   
( no stabilisation implemented and 
 
 ?̂̃?
  
  
𝑚𝑎𝑥                  
= 0.47440   at   𝛾 = 0 ) 
0.32867 
  𝑆?̂?  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
  
    
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  
   
( stabilisation implemented and 
 ?̂̃?
  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥                
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑
= 0.14568    at    ?̂?
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.02850 ) 
0.00005 
Note: Structural resilience of the empirical multiplex based on data 
for one of the quarters in the period from June 2014 to September 
2015. n refers to the number of reporting banks, ?̂? refers to the 
number of banks in the strongly connected subtensor, 𝜆 refers to the 
maximum stability condition for the connected banks,  𝛾 is the 
parameter optimised in the stabilisation strategy  and SR refers to 
systemic risk for the risk and resilience conditions. 
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VI:  Conclusions 
Single-layer networks have now been adopted in modelling financial systems, 
however this task rather requires multilayer models, or interconnected multiplex 
networks as first approximation. There are few studies using non-interconnected 
multiplexes for modelling the structure of financial systems, and this has limitations 
in representing and analysing the complex system. The existing analyses also use the 
networks to represent but not affect the structure, and the approaches quite loosely 
follow regulatory requirements. We have identified gaps not addressed in current 
research, and then formulated solutions and provided empirical analysis. 
There are powerful implementations of ensemble networks to non-financial 
domains. We touched on their ability to approach problems where single networks 
cannot cope, when evolving an ensemble and implementing to equity analysis in 
(Serguieva, Kalganova, 2002). The nature of the problem in focus here requires 
multilayer rather than ensemble networks, however we still address the capabilities 
of evolving networks as highly effective computational-intelligence techniques. 
Evolving an interconnected multiplex network through multiple periods allows not 
only modelling the multiple-market structure but also simulating strategies and 
suggesting meta-strategies for subtly affecting the structure towards building in 
targeted resilience. The hybrid approach can work with dynamic meta-strategies.8  
The contributions in this study are as follows:   
(i) The structure accounts for minimum capital requirements based on risk weighted 
assets.   
                                                          
8  The dynamic meta-strategies provide incentives for the participants to adapt to and discover more-
resilient structures but do not impose a particular structure. In computational intelligence terminology, this 
is analogous to a reinforcement learning technique. 
Table 6: Systemic Impact Ranking and Indexes in Multiple Markets vs a Single Market 
Institutions E F G 
rank at  ?̂?𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 = 0, 
(multiple-market contagion dynamics) 
2 10 
0 
(not participating  
in the multiplex strongly-connected 
component) 
rank at  for   𝛾 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠  
  = 0, 
(single-market contagion dynamics) 
17 9 18 
𝑆𝐼?̂?(𝑖)
    at  ?̂? = 0 
(multiple-market systemic impact) 
16.34% 0.33% 0% 
𝑆𝐼𝐼
  
𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
(𝑖)  at  𝛾 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠  
  
𝐸𝐴𝐷
= 0  
(single-market systemic impact) 
0.28% 4.05% 0.23% 
Note: Systemic Impact Ranking and Indexes in Multiple Markets vs a Single Market based on data for one of the 
quarters in the period from June 2014 to September 2015.  𝛾 is the parameter optimised in the stabilisation 
strategy and SII refer to the Systemic Impact Index for multiple market and single market systemic impact. 
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(ii) The contagion model is formulated with an overall ‘infection’ (spreading) rate 
that allows for a unique spreading rate of each institution, both in single-market 
contagion and in multiple-market contagion.   
(iii) The structure of the derivatives market accounts for positive net exposures in two 
directions between the same two institutions, due to different netting sets and 
enforceable netting agreements.   
(iv) The derivatives market is analysed acknowledging that exposures on a going-
concern basis (to a non-failed bank) and exposures at-default (to a failing bank) 
differ. The values of MtM net derivatives exposures after collateral and MtM net 
derivatives exposures at default are used, correspondingly.   
(v) Systemic risk measures and systemic resilience measures are formulated, both 
for a single market and for the interconnected multiplex of markets. These are 
structural rather than monetary measures. However, the focus here is on building 
in structural resilience that then allows a system to sustain its associated 
monetary value.   
(vi) Systemic impact indexes are formulated for each institution, both in a single 
market and within the multiple-market structure. The terminology ‘systemic 
impact index’ rather than ‘systemic risk index’ is used to indicate that the 
potential of an institution to affect the structure, though contributing to 
contagion processes, can also be used in strategies to contribute to stabilisation 
processes. 
(vii) Single-channel and multiple-channel stabilisation strategies are formulated that 
subtly and adaptively evolve the structure towards targeted thresholds of lower 
systemic risk or higher systemic resilience. The stabilisation mechanism works at 
a minimum cost for each institution and no cost for the system as a whole. It 
introduces subtle structural changes that do not restrict emerged interactions 
and preferences among institutions but rather balance how the system as a 
whole copes with the emerged structure of exposures. The mechanism could be 
implemented as part of the market infrastructure. This may also lead to 
institutions gradually adapting their preferences to the mechanism, and thus 
leading to the emergence of interactions underlying a more stable structure that 
would involve fewer and infrequent stabilisation steps. 
(viii) All institutions that participate at the end of a period in the strongly connected 
component of the multilayer network, also have nonzero systemic impact 
indexes and the potential to affect the structure at the beginning of the next 
period. Only if the system does not meet a targeted threshold at the end of a 
period, a stabilisation step is applied at the beginning of the next period. It 
involves all institutions with nonzero systemic index rather than the very top few, 
in order to achieve effective rebalancing, where minimum charged fractions are 
immediately redistributed as compensations. If we look for an analogy, this 
mechanism may resemble the varying margin within the current clearance 
mechanisms. This also acknowledges that systemic risk is not entirely a fault of 
an institution but of the emerged structure. 
(ix) Empirical simulations of single-channel and multiple-channel contagion and 
stabilisation processes are performed using large granular databases now 
available to the Bank of England. The simulations confirm the ability of the 
multiplex network to capture contagion dynamics throughout multiple 
interconnected markets. The simulations also confirm the ability of the designed 
multilayer stabilisation strategies to pre-emptively build in structural resilience 
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and reduce a potential contagion effect. The empirical systemic impact indexes 
for the same institutions differ within a single market and multiple markets, and 
therefore a strategy that builds in resilience within a single market will not 
stabilise the interconnected multiplex of markets. Building in resilience within the 
multiplex will stabilise the single markets in the context of their interlinkages 
within the overall structure. 
Next, we will extend the current analysis comparatively across different quarterly 
periods, involving in each period the three markets first separately and then as an 
interconnected multiplex. We will further design, simulate and compare different 
multi-period meta-strategies with dynamic thresholds. Finally, the multichannel 
processes can be instantiated with more granular and higher frequency data 
(Serguieva, 2016b). We anticipate confirming within the more dynamic setting, the 
current result that the potential for multichannel contagion through the multiplex 
structure contributes more to systemic fragility than single-channel contagion, but 
multichannel stabilisation also contributes more to systemic resilience than single-
channel stabilisation. 
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